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FORUM JURIDICUM
LOUISIANA COUNTERPARTS TO LEGAL
AND EQUITABLE TITLE
Gerald Le Van*
Why the absence of trusts in the civil law? That question has
been debated in the literature for more than fifty years.1 Some
writers suggest that the redactors of the Code Napoleon viewed the
trust as contrary to the political idealism that produced the French
Revolution. Preoccupied with the abolition of feudal burdens, the
Code Napoleon borrowed the idea of indivisible and absolute owner-
ship from the classical period of Roman law. According to some
scholars, the civil law had been moving toward a'concept of divided
ownership, i.e., the separation of ownership from the control of prop-
erty, when the Code Napoleon abruptly ended that trend. In those
civil law jurisdictions strongly influenced by the political idealism of
the French Revolution, the trend toward adoption of the trust con-
cept was reversed successfully. However, in some civil law jurisdic-
tions, such as Quebec, Scotland, South Africa and later Latin
America, which were situated near influential common law neigh-
bors, the notion of separating ownership from control gained con-
siderable currency! In one way or another, these latter jurisdictions
accomodated their laws to the practical necessity of the trust device.
Though called a "substitution" in Quebec, and a "fidei commissario"
in Mexico, the accomodation has been made.
Perhaps more than any other civil law jurisdiction, Louisiana
has embraced the language and concepts of the Anglo-American
trust. Some commentators have, referred to the Louisiana Trust
Code of 1964 as an amalgamation of the Trust Estates Law, the
Restatement of Trusts and the Uniform Principal and Income Act.'
Yet some gaps remain.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University
1. Lepaulle, Civil Law Substitutes for Trusts, 36 YALE L. J. 1126 (1927); Gar-
rigues, Law of Trusts, 2 AM. J. COMP. L. 25 (1953); Stone, Trusts in Louisiana, 1 INT'L
& COmP. L. Q. 368 (1952); Comment, Why No Trusts in the Civil Law?, 2 AM. J. CoMP.
L. 209 (1953).
2. See Comment, supra note 1, at 208-12. See also Garrigues, supra note 1, at
30-32; Pringsheim, Legal Estate and Equitable Interest in Roman Law, 59 L. Q. Ruv.
244 (1943).
3. See generally Oppenheim, Introductory Comments to the Louisiana Trust
Code, LA. R.S. 3A, XXVII & XXXI (Supp. 1965).
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Prior to the enactment of the Trust Code, the precise interests
of the trust beneficiary and the trustee in the trust property were
ill-defined. Who was the owner of the trust property? Was the
owner the trustee who could manage, but not enjoy, or the benefi-
ciary who could enjoy, but not manage? Since orthodox civil law prop-
erty concepts forbade the bifurcation of ownership, it was arguable
that the owner was either the beneficiary or the trustee, but in no
case both. After all, ownership was supposed to be absolute and
indivisible.
The Trust Code of 1964 did not undertake specifically to settle
the question. Perhaps the sole clue is found in section 1781 which
provides:-"A trustee is a person to whom title to the trust property
is transferred to be administered by him as a fiduciary."' If "title"
were tantamount to absolute and indivisible ownership, then the
ownership of trust property must be in the trustee. Thus, when the
attributes of ownership become important, one would look to the
trustee's title for the appropriate solution.
However, suppose a trust beneficiary marries after the trust is
created and thereafter divorces while the trust is still in existence.
The non-beneficiary spouse claims that trust income accruing during
the marriage fell into the community. In Reynolds v. Reynolds,' the
Louisiana Supreme Court has recently supplied an answer, if not a
solution.
Mrs. Reynolds was one of four beneficiaries of a testamentary
trust created prior to her marriage. Some of the trust income accru-
ing to her interest during her marriage was distributed to her and
deposited by her in a bank account to which she had sole access.
The remainder of Mrs. Reynolds' share of the income was accum-
ulated by the trustee under discretionary powers granted in the
trust instrument. Upon divorce, her ex-husband claimed that all of
the trust income accruing during the marriage, both distributed and
undistributed, had fallen into the community. Mrs. Reynolds had not
recorded an affidavit of paraphernality as required by former Civil
Code article 2386.6 She claimed, on the other hand, that all distri-
buted and undistributed income was her separate property, relying
upon Dunham v. Dunham.'
The third circuit held that all of the trust income accruing dur-
ing the marriage fell into the community, whether distributed or not.
4. LA. R.S. 9:1781 (Supp. 1964) (emphasis added).
5. 388 So. 2d 1135 (La. 1980).
6. The same principle is carried forward into the current law. LA. CIV. CODE art.
2339.
7. 174 So. 2d 898 (La. App. 1st. Cir. 1965). But see United States v. Burglass, 172
F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1949).
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On original hearing the supreme court reversed.' The majority
based its decision on the nature of the trustee's title, predicated on
section 1781 of the Trust Code, which equates title with ownership.
The majority interpreted that article on original hearing:
That the title transferred to the trustee in the case at bar was
intended to vest ownership in the trustee is made manifest by
the meaning of the word "title" . . . . When ownership is vested
in the trustee with full powers as such it cannot be said that the
beneficiary of the trust then has rights in the property which
entitle her to its fruits unless, as in this case, the trustee willed
it so. No statute in Louisiana confers upon a trust beneficiary ...
the ownership of the corpus of the trust; the interest of the
beneficiary is an interest in the trust, not in the corpus.
Likewise, no Louisiana case . . . confers upon the beneficiary a
right of ownership in the corpus of the trust. . . . While . . .
ownership remained in the trustee the fruits of the property
could not fall into the community between the beneficiary wife
and her husband. . . . The beneficiary . . . had no right to
administer the trust property; the full authority in that respect
was vested in the trustee .... She was without even the slight-
est indicia of ownership so long as the trust endured. Thus the
funds transferred to the wife as beneficiary of the trust prior to
the dissolution of her marriage were not the fruits of her pro-
perty. The funds were, instead, property which she received
from income of the trust corpus owned by the trustee. If
however, these funds, once transferred to the wife's account,
had produced revenues in the form of interest or otherwise, that
interest would have become "fruit" to her separate property and
as such would fall into the community existing between the par-
ties.
This same result, although somewhat differently postured factu-
ally, pertains to the undistributed trust revenues. Only the
trustee had the right to order these revenues paid to the grand-
children beneficiaries and then for the purpose of their main-
tenance and education in his discretion during the existence of
the trust. So long as the trustee retained them, they remained
the property of the trust. ...
The settlor . . . plainly did not intend that the beneficiaries ...
acquire administration or control of the corpus or undistributed
revenues of the trust until the trust was terminated. At that
time the corpus of the trust and its remaining revenues were to
be delivered to her grandchildren, the beneficiaries. Until that
8. 388 So. 2d 1135 (La. 1980).
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time the beneficiaries could not invoke Article 2386 with respect
to property and its revenues owned by the trustee.
These reasons result in this Court's approval of Dunham v.
Dunham, and our decision not to consider U.S. v. Burglass,
authoritative in Louisiana State courts.9
A dissenting opinion offered by Justice Dennis, joined by Justices
Marcus and Blanche, would have adhered to the third circuit
result."
On rehearing, the supreme court held that distributed income
fell into the community, but that undistributed trust income remained
the separate property of the beneficiary spouse.
According to the plurality opinion on rehearing:
The beneficial interest of Ms. Reynolds in the trust is clearly
less than full ownership .... Title to the property vested in the
trustee.... The undistributed income from the trust was under
the control and dominion of the trustee. It accrued to the
trustee during the term of the trust, as a civil fruit unseparated
from the corpus of the trust . . . Ms. Reynolds had no right to
this money until the trustee decided to distribute it. The undis-
tributed income did not fall into the community.
Although [Ms.] Reynolds did not own the corpus of the trust, her
paraphernal estate included a beneficial interest, an incorporeal
right. ... The distributed revenues from that incorporeal right
were civil fruits .... Once distributed, the wife had full owner-
ship of this income. These fruits of the wife's paraphernal prop-
erty fell into community because no instrument was filed to
reserve them for the wife."
A dissent by the Chief Justice argued that the original opinion
was correct; ie., neither distributed nor undistributed trust income
fell into the community. Most of the dissenting opinion is devoted
to a discussion of the trustee's "title" and "ownership." The dissent
began by separating Mrs. Reynolds' interests as principal bene-
ficiary, and as income beneficiary, noting the different treatment of
these interests when creditors' rights were violated and for federal
gift tax purposes." The dissent further noted that the trust instru-
9. Id. at 1139 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
10. 388 So. 2d at 1140 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
11. 388 So. 2d at 1141 (emphasis added).
12. 388 So. 2d at 1144 (Dixon, C.J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 1144-45. Presumably this discussion refers to the spendthrift provisions
of the Trust Code, LA. R.S. 9:2001-07 (Supp. 1964), and to the distinction for federal
gift tax purposes made between "present interests" and "future interests." I.R.C. §
2503.
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ment subjected Mrs. Reynolds' income interest to spendthrift provi-
sions and gave the trustee the power to accumulate or distribute
income." This limited income interest was analogized to "an annuity
or an alimentary pension rather than as a usufruct or right to
fruits."15 As to Mrs. Reynolds' interest in principal, the dissent
opined:
It is apparent that the only interest bequeathed to Mrs.
Reynolds was the right to receive a portion of the trust corpus
at some time in the future. It should be noted that not only was
the time at which this right could be exercised made indefinite
by the terms of the will (dependent upon the possible birth of
additional grandchildren before the testator's death and the
possible deaths of the grandchildren before the age of twenty-
one) but that the amount of the property to be received was also
indefinite. That is, the percentage of the total corpus she could
ultimately receive was dependent upon the number of grand-
children living at the time of the testator's death, while the
nature and value of the corpus itself were dependent upon the
manner in which the trustee exercised his powers to manage,
lease, sell and encumber the trust property, to invest and
reinvest, and to make payments of principal to the various bene-
ficiaries in accordance with their needs. It is conceivable that
there might be no trust property upon which Mrs. Reynolds
could exercise her right to delivery at the termination of the
trust. It is because of the indeterminate nature of the interest in
principal (and also in income . . .) that "eventual interests in
trusts usually are not readily assignable.""
The dissent continued:
It is unreasonable to characterize Mrs. Reynolds' right to
receive an indefinite amount of property at an undetermined
future date as an interest which constitutes ownership of pro-
perty under the principles of this state's property law ...
It is obvious that Mrs. Reynolds' future and indefinite right is
devoid of the indispensable elements of ownership: immediacy,
dominion, and authority [citing Article 477, Civil Code as amended
in 1979]. It is argued that these elements are also absent in
situations of curatorship, tutorship and the administration of
successions, but that interdicts, minors and heirs are nonethe-
less "owners" of their property. In common law jurisdictions, the
relationship established by a trust is distinguished from the rela-
14. 388 So. 2d at 1146 (Dixon, C.J., dissenting).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1147 (emphasis added).
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tionship involved in situations like curatorship through the con-
text of title: a curator has possession and powers of disposition,
but the title to the property remains in the ward, so that the
curator may be likened to the ward's court appointed agent. 7
However, the dissent urged:
The rights granted to the trustee by the settlor constitute
ownership under our law. . . . Additional evidence of the
trustee's ownership is provided by the fact that where there are
personal liabilities incidental to ownership of the trust property,
e.g. for specific performance of contracts and convenants run-
ning with the land, these fall on the trustee just as if he were
absolute owner.... Article 477 ... authorizes the restriction of
an owner's rights "within the limits and under the conditions
established by law"-here the duties imposed upon a trustee by
the Louisiana Trust Code.
We therefore should find that Mrs. Reynolds' interest in the cor-
pus of the trust did not constitute an "ownership" of separate
property which could produce either income payments or undis-
tributed income as "fruits". Instead, the trust agreement confer-
red upon her, as a donation mortis causa, an independent interest
in receiving those funds; the income is hers by virtue of the
donation mortis causa, and therefore her separate property. 8
The dissent then reviewed the place of bifurcated ownership in a
civil law system:
Principles established in the Civil Code are designed to function
in an entire system of laws in this state. When the principle is
clear, concise, broad and universally understood and accepted, it
should not be deemed changed or abandoned by inference. If
subsequent legislation clearly indicates that our former concept
of ownership is hereafter changed or modified in some respect,
the change should be accepted. Further, if the legislature estab-
lishes a relationship between persons and property that cannot
function, or will be hampered and impeded in its operation by its
adhering to the established concept of ownership, then, and only
then, would we be justified in finding an inference that the
legislature intended to change the law of ownership.
Here there is neither statutory provision changing the meaning
of ownership, nor conceptual hiatus requiring us to find an infer-
ence of intent to change it, in order to permit the legislative
scheme to function. The trust is permitted by the Constitution
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1148 & n.3.
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(Article 12, § 5) and the statutory scheme is as complete as it
need be. Absolutely no impediment to the function of the trust
will occur by the application of the accepted Civil Code concept
of ownership. The unknown factor in this case would be the effect
of holding that the income beneficiary and the trustee both have
ownership interests in the property constituting the corpus.
The statutes do not say whether the trustee or the beneficiary
is the owner of the corpus. The trustee has title. R.S. 9:1731 con-
tains no inference that the beneficiary is the owner.... Section
1731 fixes the relationship of the trustee as a fiduciary to admin-
ister the corpus for the benefit of another. The will gave him all
the powers of ownership. Ownership powers in the trustee are
not essential for the validity or utility of a trust, but this trustee
is the owner.'
The "title" of the trustee is no more than fiduciary or
managerial. His "ownership," if any, is severely circumscribed by his
duties. A trust is not an entity, but merely a relationship arising out
of the peculiar circumstances.' During the trust relationship, ques-
tions may arise involving the ownership of the trust property; these
questions can be answered only by attributing the underlying
ownership to the beneficiaries. For example, in St. Charles Land
Trust v. St. Amant2 ' it was necessary to determine whether a non-
resident beneficiary's interest in a trust was movable or immovable
for Louisiana inheritance tax purposes. Because the trust owned only
producing mineral interests in Louisiana, the beneficiary's interest
was classified as immovable and taxed as such.' Had the ownership
of the trust property been in the trustee, and not in the beneficiary,
the beneficiary would have owned nothing; thus no tax would have
been due.23
The same question can arise in other fiduciary relationships such
as tutorship, curatorship, or in successions. In Succession of Cutrer
v. Curtis2" the first circuit concluded that an heir may sell his inter-
est in the succession while it is under administration, though he can-
not convey title to any particular property. 5 Third persons may deal
with the succession representative as though he were the owner,
19. Id. at 1149 (emphasis added).
20. LA. R.S. 9:1731 (Supp. 1964): "A trust, as the term is used in this Code, is the
relationship resulting from the transfer of title to property to a person to be adminis-
tered by him as a fiduciary for the benefit of another."
21. 253 La. 243, 217 So. 2d 385 (1969).
22. 253 La. at 258, 217 So. 2d at 390.
23. 253 La. at 251, 217 So. 2d at 388.
24. 341 So. 2d 1209 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976).
25. Id. at 1216.
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although in the civil law system, ownership passes directly to the
heir under the principle of le mort saisit le vif.2
Suppose a married person owning separate property is inter-
dicted. The power to administer his property passes to his curator.
Does the imposition of curatorship operate to change the character
of income from separate property, merely because the interdict can
no longer administer it? Is the income accruing to inherited property
the separate property of the heir or legatee merely because he can-
not compel distribution? In Baten v. Taylor 7 the supreme court
acknowledged that the heir owns even though he may not manage
for a time." In this context, at least, the court recognized the divi-
sion of ownership from control. It would seem that the same con-
cepts should apply equally to tutorship, curatorship and trusts.
The tutor, curator, or trustee may act like owners in the eyes of
third persons, but only as to third persons.' They may not enjoy the
use of the property. The true owner is the minor, the interdict, or
the beneficiary.10 The title transferred to the Louisiana trustee is
surely not absolute ownership as envisioned in the Code Napoleon,
but the investiture of fiduciary capacity to deal with third persons.8
The fiduciary may have a sort of title sufficient to transmit owner-
ship, but he can never enjoy it., Ownership, absent the power to
manage, remains in the beneficiary (minor or interdict), bereft of the
power to manage.
In terms of results, it appears the supreme court has compromised
in Reynolds. The opinion leaves several unresolved problems in its
wake. Under the rationale of Reynolds, the trustee's power to accu-
mulate income becomes the power to characterize income accuring
during the marriage, regardless of the preference of the spouses.
The characterization of income accruing during marriage tradition-
ally has been determined by the spouses themselves, either by dec-
laration of the owner spouse or by matrimonial agreement. I find no
authority in the Trust Code to disturb these normal means of classi-
fication. It seems clear that trust income, distributed or undistri-
buted, should be governed by these ordinary community property
principles.
Further implications of Reynolds are troubling. The holding
resurrects the spectre of classifying income from separate property
26. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 940.
27. 386 So. 2d 333 (La. 1979).
28. Id. at 340.
29. At common law each would have legal title.
30. At common law each would have equitable title.
31. LA. R.S. 9:1731 (Supp. 1964).
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according to the circumstances of its administration. This approach,
proven unworkable, was replaced in 1944 by notarial declaration of
paraphernality.3 2
If Reynolds means that the characterization of income depends
upon actual powers of administration available to the spouse, then
how, for example, does it apply to employee benefit trusts? Suppose
an employee marries after becoming a qualified participant in a pro-
fit sharing plan. Do the earnings accruing to his account remain his
separate property during marriage because his interest is managed
by the plan trustee? Does the income from the married interdict's
separate property remain separate because he can no longer admin-
ister that property? Does the income accruing to a bequest before
distribution remain the separate property of the legatee?
The equities were certainly with Mrs. Reynolds. As a matter of
policy, her trust income should have been insulated from the claims
of her divorced husband. However, adoption of that policy would re-
quire a fundamental change in Louisiana community property law.3
Meanwhile, the Reynolds decision has an air of instability about it.
There is no majority opinion; the supreme court was split three
ways. The plurality position may be subject to reconsideration in
future cases, hopefully along the lines suggested.
32. Former Civil Code article 2386, as amended by Act 286 of 1944, is continued in
all important particulars by article 2339. See LA. CIV. CODE 2339, as amended by 1979
La. Acts, No. 709.
33. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2339, as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 709.
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